Perception of Probabilities in Situations of Risk A Case Based Approach by Gabrielle Gayer Y
Perception of Probabilities in Situations of Risk
A Case Based Approach￿
Gabrielle Gayery
Tel Aviv University
November 20, 2005
Abstract
This paper tries to provide a preliminary description of the mental process individ-
uals experience in their attempt to comprehend stated probabilities of simple lotteries.
The evaluation of probabilities is based on three main components: lotteries encoun-
tered in the past, the realizations of these lotteries, and the similarity between stated
probabilities. A probability is evaluated based on the experienced relative frequencies
of outcomes that had that stated probability, as well as outcomes of other lotteries,
that had similar stated probabilities. This process may result in distortion of prob-
abilities as observed in the literature, in particular overvaluing low probabilities and
undervaluing of high probabilities. We also ￿nd that when the size of the memory
grows, the decision maker learns the real value of the stated probabilities.
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11 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that in situations of decision making under risk, people do not
exhibit a clear understanding of the stated probabilities of possible outcomes, as re￿ ected in
their choices. Decision makers often appear to behave as though distorting their perception
of probabilities. Indeed, this phenomenon was experimentally tested and documented by
Preston and Baratta (1947), Mosteller and Nogee (1951) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
In an attempt to reconcile this research with a coherent theory, Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) proposed an inverse S-shaped probability weight function that conformed
more accurately to observed behavior. This theory has been widely studied and extensively
tested. However, for the most part, neither research in psychology nor in decision theory has
addressed the question of the reasons for and the mechanisms of the distortion phenomenon.
Understanding its mechanism is not only of theoretical interest in and of itself, but may also
reveal the full scope of its in￿ uence, which is as yet unclear.
This paper attempts to provide a possible account of how and why people tend
to distort probabilities. We start from the expected utility paradigm (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944), suggesting that a lottery (x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) (where xi are outcomes and
pi are probabilities) be evaluated according to
U((x1;p1;:::;xn;pn)) =
X
i
piu(xi) (1)
for a real-valued utility function u. Formula (1) might be taken as a description of an
explicit computation that a decision maker performs when evaluating a prospect. In this
literal interpretation, the decision maker is aware of a numerical utility function, calculates
the U-value of each lottery, and chooses a maximizer of (1). In this case, the decision maker
would have no reason to distort probabilities beyond the possible rounding-o⁄ necessary to
simplify calculations.
2However, (1) may be considered as a metaphor of a cognitive process that is not ex-
plicitly algebraic and need not contain a speci￿c utility function. More concretely, equation
(1) might be regarded as suggesting that each outcome xi invokes some rough hedonic eval-
uation, which we model by u(xi), as a measure of desirability. This measure of desirability
interacts with a measure of plausibility, pi, in a way that we approximate by piu(xi). The
aggregation of all these possible outcomes, modeled as the sum of these expressions, is a
measure of the evaluation of the lottery.
This more metaphorical interpretation of (1) raises the question of how the probability
numbers, stated in the problem to be pi, re￿ ect the plausibility judgments. For instance,
how do decision makers respond to a stated probability such as pi = 1
6 or pi = 0:347?
In this paper we take the view that decision makers attempt to make sense of stated
probabilities by associating them with relative frequencies of these (or of similar) stated
probabilities encountered in risk situations in the past1. For instance, faced with the stated
value pi = 1
2, an individual is reminded of all past cases in which she had tossed fair coins.
Each toss of a coin is associated with the implicit but well-known probability of 1
2. Thus,
most adults who have many cases of pi = 1
2-tosses in memory2, when introduced with any
new such case, would bring these past cases to mind. Hence, relying on the relative frequency
would lead to an assessment of probability around 1
2. If, however, the decision maker is faced
with pi = 0:347, it may well be the case that she had never encountered lotteries involving
this exact probability in the past. How would the decision maker interpret such a probability
number? We suggest that she may base her judgement on prior experience with similar values
such as pi = 1
3.
The decision maker￿ s experience is modeled as a set of cases. In this context, a case
1This is inspired by case-based decision theory (CBDT) introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995 and
2001). However, the context and formulation here are di⁄erent.
2The term memory has the same meaning as experience and is de￿ned explicitly in section 3.
3consists of the stated probability of an outcome and a result indicating whether the outcome
had materialized. The process of evaluating a probability is a comparison of the current case
to stated probabilities of past cases residing in the decision maker￿ s memory while taking into
account their realization. This procedure formalizes the evaluation of probabilities based on
the relative frequencies of outcomes. However, not only does it consider identical cases to
the one at hand, but it considers similar cases as well. This type of procedure may lead to
distortion of probabilities as in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and 1992),
namely, overvaluation of low probabilities and undervaluation of high probabilities.
We assume that even if the decision maker is unable to understand the meaning
of a stated probability, she is nevertheless able to establish a level of similarity between
probabilities. For example, she is able to say that the probability of landing on ￿1￿when
tossing a red die is identical to the probability of landing on that same number when tossing
a blue die, even without knowing the real probability of landing on ￿1￿ . She can also
understand that the probability of landing on a speci￿c number, when spinning a roulette
wheel containing 30 numbers is closer to the probability of landing on that number when
the spinning wheel contains 31 numbers than when it contains 32 numbers.
Probably the most basic similarity function is that of a ￿frequentist￿who assigns a
positive similarity to identical cases and no similarity at all to any other case. This results
in an evaluation of stated probabilities based only on relative frequencies of identical cases.
This approach is sensible if the decision maker has a huge memory that includes many cases
for each stated probability in question. If memory is not that exhaustive, for some stated
probabilities pi we may ￿nd that the set of cases in which pi was encountered is very small
or even empty. This would mean that empirical frequencies are not very reliable, if at all
well-de￿ned. In these cases, the process presented in this paper, which allows for decisions
based on comparison of similar situations is more realistic. The decision maker will generally
be able to approximate an assessment. Moreover, allowing consideration of similar cases may
4produce evaluations that are closer to the true probabilities.
We assume that the degree of similarity between two given cases depends on the
decision maker￿ s experience and in particular on the number occurrences of cases in memory.
By analogy, imagine a situation where a doctor needs to evaluate the probability of success
of a treatment. An experienced doctor who has a large memory to draw on can a⁄ord to
use only very similar cases. By contrast, an inexperienced doctor might end up with a very
small memory were she to use only very similar cases. Hence she would tend to use a more
permissive similarity function. In this context, we assume that only the numerical degree of
similarity varies as memory grows however the similarity (ordinal) ranking does not change.
That is, doctors may agree that case x resembles case y more than case z, while implicitly
disagreeing about the relevance of z. In our model, we similarly assume that the larger the
memory, the lower the weight assigned to distant probabilities and the higher the weight
assigned to close probabilities. This property will be shown to imply that even though the
decision maker is not able to understand the exact meaning of the stated probabilities, she
will eventually learn to evaluate them according to their true probabilities.
The next section illustrates the model and shows how it can account for the version
of the Allais paradox known as "the common ratio e⁄ect. Section 3 introduces the formal
model, followed by an elaboration of the case of the k-nearest neighbors similarity function
in section 4. Section 5 shows examples. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Illustration
The ￿Allais Paradox,￿perhaps one of the most prominent examples of discrepancies between
behavior predicted by expected utility theory and observed behavior, was resolved by using
distortion of probabilities. The common ratio version of the ￿Allais Paradox￿states that
most people faced with a choice between winning $3000 with a probability of 1 or winning
5$4000 with a probability of 0.8 prefer the former lottery over the latter. When faced with the
choice between winning $3000 with a probability of 0.25 or winning $4000 with a probability
of 0.2, most people prefer the latter lottery over the former, which violates the independence
axiom (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
In this context it may be natural to ask what kind of memory generates these prefer-
ences. Let￿ s suppose that memory includes cases with the probabilities of 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
This re￿ ects the knowledge of a decision maker with considerable experience in tosses of two
fair coins in conjunction. When confronted with a probability of 0.8, she tends to undervalue
it, since it most resembles 0.75. On the other hand, the probability of 0.2 is overvalued since
it resembles 0.25. This can lead to the pattern of preferences stated above. Note that this
solution depends on the probabilities in the decision maker￿ s memory and di⁄erent memories
may lead to di⁄erent preferences.
A di⁄erent explanation for the same version of the ￿Allais Paradox￿was presented
by Rubinstein (1988). As Rubinstein pointed out, most theories of decision-making under
risk do not deal with the mental processes involved in reaching a decision. Rubinstein￿ s
model includes lotteries that o⁄er a certain prize with a certain probability (and otherwise
zero). He suggests the ￿ procedure, according to which, if the probabilities involved in two
lotteries are similar but the prizes are not, preference is determined by the higher prize,
and vice versa if the prizes are similar but the probabilities are not. In the example of the
common ratio e⁄ect above, Rubinstein￿ s explanation is that the probabilities 0.2 and 0.25
are similar, whereas 0.8 and 1 are not. Hence the choice between 0.2 of $4000 and 0.25 of
$3000 is governed by the higher prize, whereas the choice between 0.8 of $4000 and $3000
with certainty need not be determined by the higher prize.
The present paper shares the basic motivation of Rubinstein (1988), namely, to explic-
itly model the mental process of choice in a plausible way. The two models also rely on the
concept of similarity. But there are several important di⁄erences between the two models.
6First, Rubinstein￿ s theory compares probabilities of lotteries under discussion to each other,
while here the probabilities are compared to cases in memory. Second, as apposed to the ￿
procedure the evaluation here seems closer to classical decision theory in that each lottery
has its own index, which is independent of other lotteries and the decision maker chooses a
maximizer of this index. Third, Rubinstein views probabilities as either similar or dissimilar
whereas we have a continuous similarity function. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly,
in Rubinstein￿ s model similarity is used to ignore probabilities in certain cases, that is, to
cancel them out in the decision making procedures. By contrast, in our model the similar
probabilities are those that do enter the evaluation process. Finally, Rubinstein￿ s comparison
of probabilities is a method for determining which lottery is preferable, whereas the process
described here is only a preliminary stage in the evaluation of stated probabilities.
3 The Model
A decision maker faced with a situation of risk must evaluate each probability of a lottery
l = (x1;q1;:::;xn;qn) with n possible outcomes. The outcomes are xi for i = 1;:::;n and
stated probabilities of these outcomes are qi; for i = 1;:::;n which are all positive numbers
that add to 1.
The premise of this paper is closely related to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), therefore
it will follow the terms and notation that were proposed there. Let P ￿ (0;1) be a ￿nite
set of stated probabilities and L be a set of lotteries that are composed of these stated
probabilities in P, l 2 L ￿
(
(x1;p1;:::;xJ;pJ)
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
pi 2 P, pi > 0,
J X
i=1
pi = 1
)
.
Let M be a ￿nite set of all possible cases that the decision maker may experience in
di⁄erent lotteries. A case is a pair (p;d) where p 2 P is a stated probability of an outcome
in a lottery and d 2 D ￿ f0;1g assumes the value of 1 if the outcome was realized and 0
7otherwise. Thus,
M = P ￿ D
A decision maker￿ s memory will be modeled by a function:
I : M ! fN;0g
that counts the number of occurrences of each case in M that the decision maker actually
experienced. Each experience of a lottery with h possible outcomes adds h new occurrences
of cases to memory. For example, imagine a person whose memory includes only one lottery
l = (x1;pi;x2;1 ￿ pi) that was repeated ten times, in which the ￿rst outcome was realized
twice and the second outcome was realized eight times. Her memory I will be: I(pi;1) = 2;
I(1￿pi;1) = 8; I(pi;0) = 8 and I(1￿pi;0) = 2 and I(pj;1) = I(pj;0) = 0 for pj 6= pi: Later
on we will see that the decision maker evaluates q both from outcomes that were realized as
well as from outcomes that were not.
The similarity function s is based on the distance between q; the probability that is
being evaluated and p; a stated probability in the decision maker￿ s memory. Let s
s : P ￿ P ￿! [0;1]
be a continuous, single peaked function, that strictly decreases as the distance between
its two arguments increases. Moreover, s(q;p) assumes a value of one if and only if p and q
are identical and the value of zero only if the distance between q and p is one. We assume
in addition that s(q;p) is twice di⁄erentiable3.
The level of similarity between two stated probabilities is not only determined by the
similarity function but also depends on the size of memory. Let ￿ be proportional to the size
of memory, i.e. ￿ = ￿
P
(p;d) 2M I(p;d) for a ￿nite and positive ￿. We assume that a case
3The similarity function s(q;p) need not be di⁄erentiable at p = q.
8in which p is the stated probability is considered similar to the present one to the degree
s(q;p)￿:
Let q be a stated probability to be evaluated, the evaluation process can be described
by:
q =
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)￿d
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)￿ (2)
Two special similarity function are s(q;p) = 1 if q = p and 0 otherwise, and s(q;p) = 1
for all p and q4. In the ￿rst example q is evaluated solely by the realization of cases in memory
with a stated probability of q and all other cases are disregarded. In the second example all
occurrences of cases in memory are teated equally.
This model focuses on cases that fall in between these two extreme examples. Since
s is strictly decreasing in distance of p and q and assigns positive values to cases that are
not identical, this function becomes a weighted average of the outcomes. The weights are
determined by the number of occurrences of each case and their similarity to q where values
closer to q get higher weight. The bigger the value of ￿; the smaller the weight assigned to
distant probabilities. Making ￿ a positive function of the size of memory indicates that large
memories ascribe less weight to dissimilar probabilities than do small memories.
If we were to ignore ￿ in the de￿nition of q, formula (2) becomes
~ q =
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)d
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)
(3)
This formula (3) for evaluation of probabilities was axiomatized in Gilboa, Lieberman,
and Schmeidler (2004) for cases with two possible outcomes and in Billot, Gilboa, Samet,
and Schmeidler (2003) with cases of more than two possible outcomes. However, letting
￿ di⁄er with the size of memory no longer falls into their framework5. We ￿nd formula (2)
4Neither of the two similarity functions satis￿e the conditions above.
5Speci￿cally, the ￿combinatiom axiom￿used in both these derivations is violated in our case.
9used here more reasonable than formula (3) used in Gilboa et. al (2004) because the former
captures the intuition that, with data around, people prefer to rely on identical rather than
nearly similar cases. Thanks to this feature of the model, an evaluator using (2) who has
a lot of experience with lotteries would eventually learn the real probabilities. As memory
grows, evaluation of probabilities converges to the real frequency of outcomes.
The subjects of Preston and Baratta￿ s (1947) experiments were both faculty members
who had substantial experience with probabilities and graduate students who had none. The
results indicated that both groups distorted probabilities, however the distortion was greater
among the group of students who had no experience. This learning process is captured by
proposition 1.
For the purpose of proposition 1 we assume that each lottery in memory is repeated
an in￿nite number of times and that outcomes of the lotteries are independent. The un-
derlying state space is ￿ = (L;X)N where N denotes the natural numbers. A state is
! = ((l1;x1);(l2;x2):::) 2 ￿ where lt 2 L is the experienced lottery at time t and xt 2 X is
the realized outcome. The probability measure ￿ on ￿ satis￿es the following two conditions:
1. ￿(xi
t j 8(l1;x1);:::;(lt￿1;xt￿1) 2 ￿; and lt = (x1
t;p1;:::;xn
t ;pn)) = pi, meaning that
stated probabilities are equal to the true probabilities and are independent of past outcomes.
2. ￿(! j 9l 2 L and 9T such that 8t > T l 6= lt) = 0, meaning that each lottery is
repeated an in￿nite number of times.
Proposition 1 Let ￿ and ￿ be as described above. Take any q 2 P, then q converges in
probability to q:
All proofs can be found in the appendix. The proof is based on the fact that s(q;p)
decreases as the distance between p and q increases. When ￿ grows to in￿nity, only identical
cases in￿ uence the evaluation of q. Moreover, the law of large numbers insures that the
10evaluation converges to the actual probability6.
We assume that each case in memory is repeated an in￿nite number of times, indepen-
dently of past periods. This guarantees convergence of the relative frequencies of occurrence
of the most similar case, which, in turn, implies the convergence of q. But even when the
number of repetitions of some cases is ￿nite, the limit of q still exists and is simply the
relative frequency of cases that most resemble q. Even if the assumption that the stated
probability p is equal to its true probability is false, the decision maker will nevertheless
evaluate q according to its true probability. Therefore, as long as the decision maker assigns
the highest similarity only to identical cases, she will be able to learn the true probability.
There are a few properties of this evaluation process that should be emphasized.
Whenever memory includes lotteries with only two outcomes, (p;1) and (1￿p;0) both must
have the same number of occurrences. If, in addition, s is symmetric in the sense that: for
every q and p s(q;p) = s(1￿q;1￿p) then the sum of the evaluations of q and (1￿q) equal
one. Moreover, if for all cases (p;d) in memory I(p;d) is replaced by I(1 ￿ p;d)), then the
new evaluation of q will be the old evaluation of (1￿q): Following from these properties, the
evaluation of q = 0:5 will always be 0:5 for every possible memory I and any ￿. According
to this evaluation process, people immediately understand the probability 0:5. This type of
probability distortion resembles Quiggin￿ s (1982) probability weights in that his symmetry
assumption leads to 0:5 being a ￿xed point of the probability distortion function. However,
when memory includes lotteries with more than two outcomes and sk is concave in p and
symmetric, then q cuts the 45￿ line at a point less than 0:5. This in turn may resemble
Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) probability weights that cut the 45￿ line between 0:2 and
0:3 (although in the present model there will be more than one intersection point for a large
6The limit of q is a step function where q for q = 2 P converges to the stated probability of its most similar
case.
11enough ￿- see examples in section 5).
Until now, it was assumed that the decision maker can establish which probabilities
are closer to each other and that she can remember the outcomes. A priori the decision
maker cannot determine that high probabilities have a better chance of being realized than
low probabilities. The estimation of q is a function of the frequency of the realizations of each
probability in memory. If in fact the realization of high probabilities in memory occurred
relatively more times than those of low probabilities, the decision maker will understand
that outcomes of high probabilities are more likely to be realized and vice versa. We de￿ne
a monotonically increasing memory as a memory in which for all p 2 P, if p ￿ p0 then
I(p;1)
I(p;1)+I(p;0) ￿
I(p0;1)
I(p0;1)+I(p0;0).
Proposition 2 If memory is monotonically increasing and
@2s(q;p)
@q@p ￿ 0, then q is monotoni-
cally increasing in q: That is, if q ￿ q0 then q ￿ q0 (the last inequality is reversed if memory
is monotonically decreasing).
The meaning of proposition 2 is that, under relatively unrestrictive assumptions on
the structure of the similarity function s; the decision maker understands that outcomes of
high probabilities are more likely to be realized than those of low probabilities. For the case
where s is a function of ￿, where ￿ = jp ￿ qj, the requirement that
@2s(q;p)
@q@p ￿ 0 has a natural
interpretation as it implies that s is in concave in ￿. This will indicate that changing the
distance by a little for cases that are considered close will not in￿ uence the similarity as
much as changing the distance when are cases are further away from each other.
Furthermore, with this method of evaluating probabilities low probabilities will be
overvalued while high probabilities will be undervalued.
Proposition 3 For all q ￿ ql, where ql = minp2P
￿
I(p;1)
I(p;0)+I(p;1)
￿
the evaluation of q is over-
valued, that is ￿ q ￿ q and for all q ￿ qh, where qh = maxp2P
￿
I(p;1)
I(p;0)+I(p;1)
￿
the evaluation of
12q is undervalued, that is ￿ q ￿ q:
If the relative frequency of each stated probability in memory is equal to its real
probability, then proposition 3 implies the overvaluation of all probabilities lower than the
lowest stated probability in memory. Likewise, all probabilities higher than the highest
stated probability will be undervalued. Note that if the lowest relative frequency of some
stated probability in memory is zero, proposition 3 no longer assures this distortion of prob-
abilities. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that the overvaluation of very low probabilities and
undervaluation of very high probabilities will still occur. Since s assumes a value of zero only
if the distance between q and p is one, then q(0) > 0 and q(1) < 1: Due to the continuity of q;
low stated probabilities will be overvalued and high stated probabilities will be undervalued.
This result corroborates the evidence of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) where decision
makers are very sensitive to the di⁄erences between certain and uncertain situations.
It may appear that only stated probabilities that are arbitrarily close to zero are
guaranteed to be overvalued and, likewise, only stated probabilities that are arbitrarily close
to one are guaranteed to be undervalued. However, it is possible to show that, given a
memory in which pl and ph are the lowest and highest stated probabilities, respectively, on
average all q < pl are overvalued and all q > ph are undervalued. The next example illustrates
that the overvaluation of small stated probabilities and the undervaluation of high stated
probabilities is signi￿cant. In particular, on average, even low stated probabilities higher
than pl are overvalued and high stated probabilities lower than ph are undervalued.
The decision maker￿ s memory consists of cases based on lotteries l1;:::;lL with only
two possible outcomes li 2 fx1i;pi;x2i;1 ￿ pig. The stated probabilities in memory are
iid random variables drawn from a uniform distribution pi ￿ U [0;0:5], where the stated
probabilities pi, are the true probabilities. Speci￿cally, let 1(pi) be an indicator function
that assumes the value 1 if the outcome attached to it is realized and zero otherwise, then
131(pi) is distributed Bernoulli(pi). The similarity between q and p; s(q;p) is a function of ￿,
where ￿ = jp ￿ qj.
Proposition 4 Let li, pi and s(q;p) be as described above. Then for q < 1
2, E(￿ q) > q and
for q > 1
2, E(￿ q) < q .
This model should be applied only to a situation with non-trivial risk. There is no
mathematical limitation that prevents the evaluation of an outcome with a probability of
zero or one. But the model would then imply that the stated probabilities of zero and one
are always distorted, so that q(0) will always be greater than zero and q(1) will always be
smaller than one7. We ￿nd this result counterintuitive. Yet, we do not believe that a model
that explains the evaluation of probabilities in (0;1) should also apply to f0;1g: Rather, we
maintain that the mental process of making decisions under risk is not the same as that of
making decisions under certainty. Consequently the probabilities of zero and one need not
be evaluated according to their relative frequencies or their similarity to other cases.
4 Modi￿cations of the similarity function
The previous section was restricted to continuous similarity functions. Perhaps this speci￿-
cation is too limited, since it does not include the k nearest neighbors model (k-NN), which
is extensively used in computer science (see, e.g., Cover and Hart, 1967 and Duda and Hart,
1973). The most common use of the k-NN model is for classi￿cation problems where the
prediction of the outcome of a new case is determined by the most frequent outcome among
the k nearest neighbors. The k-NN model was generalized to include other cases, such as
regressions that take the average of the outcomes of the k nearest neighbors. In this case all
7There are speci￿c similarity functions that are not de￿ned when comparing cases with non-trivial risk
to cases of certainty. See section 5 example 2.
14k nearest neighbors are treated equally (Cover, 1968). There also exist other variants of this
model that let the closest points among the k nearest neighbors have more in￿ uence on the
outcome by taking a weighted average. One of the main goals of k-NN model is to ￿nd the
optimal number of neighbors that performs best in predictions.
In the context of this model the similarity function based on the k nearest neighbor
is
s(q;p) =
8
> <
> :
1
X
(pi;d)2f(pi;d)jjpi￿qj<jp￿qjg
I(pi;d) < K
0 otherwise
(4)
and the evaluation process can be described by:
q =
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)d
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)
(5)
Notice that since s(q;p) 2 f0;1g the power of ￿ from the previous section is omitted.
Note, however, that the roles that ￿, the size of memory and K, the number of neighbors
play in the evaluation of q are similar.
The similarity between a stated probability q and a case with probability p does not
only depend on the distance between p and q but also on the distance between q and the
rest of the cases in memory. If a case is among the k nearest neighbors then the similarity
is equal to one, otherwise it is zero. Observe that according to this de￿nition there might
actually be more than k occurrences with a similarity of one. This is because each case in
memory can be repeated a number of times and this de￿nition allows us to assign the same
similarity value to identical cases.
Proposition 1 only relies on the assumption that s(q;p) is single-peaked, namely that
s(q;q) = 1 and s(q;p) < 1 if p 6= q. Hence, a counterpart of proposition 1 for the k-NN
15similarity function will hold in the case of the k-NN as long as the following two conditions
are satis￿ed:
8p 2 P ￿(! j I(p;0) + I(p;1) ￿ K) = 1 (6)
lim P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d)!1
K ! 1 (7)
The ￿rst condition (6) assure that, at the limit, the only relevant cases in the evaluation of
q are cases with a stated probability q; that is, these condition lead to a similarity function
s(q;p), which is equal to one if p = q and otherwise to zero. The last condition (7) assures
that the evaluation of q converges in probability to the true probability. Adding the condition
that, lim P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d)!1
1
K
P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d) ! 1 will make the conditions resemble those of kernel
estimations (see, Prakasa-Rao, 1983, Devroye and Gyor￿, 1985 and Devroye, 1983). In order
to get asymptotic results of convergence, as the number of observations goes to in￿nity, the
bandwidth goes to zero and the product of the number of observations and the bandwidth
goes to in￿nity. Here, 1
K plays the role of the bandwidth and
P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d) plays the role of
the number of observations.
An alternative way to de￿ne the k-NN similarity function is to de￿ne it on cases
instead of on occurrences. By this de￿nition, s(q;p) is equal to one if p belongs to one of
the k nearest cases in memory and is equal to zero otherwise. In this case proposition 1 will
hold if K = 1. However, it is more natural to look at each occurrence as a separate neighbor
rather than looking at a group of occurrences as a separate neighbor.
We cannot prove Proposition 2 using the same method as before, however it is simple
to show that proposition 2 still holds for the case of the k-NN similarity function. The proof
relies on the fact that the evaluation of a stated probability is a weighted average of relative
frequencies of the k nearest neighbors. For a stated probability q which is larger than q0
the relative frequencies of the k nearest neighbors of q are at least as large as those of q0 if
16memory is monotonically increasing .
Proposition 5 Consider the k-NN similarity function. If memory is monotonically increas-
ing, then q is monotonically increasing in q: That is, if q ￿ q0 then q ￿ ￿ q0 (the last inequality
is reversed if memory is monotonically decreasing).
Proposition 3 also holds for the case of the k-NN where low probabilities are over-
valued and high probabilities are undervalued. Proposition 4 must be modi￿ed since s(q;p)
no longer relies only on the distance between q and p, but also on the distance between q
and the rest of the cases in memory. However, given that cases in memory have a uniform
distribution, for q < 1
2 there is a greater chance that q has more neighbors that are higher
rather than lower than q resulting in the overvaluation of q on average. The reverse is true
if q > 1
2.
5 Examples
This section presents examples of three di⁄erent types of similarity functions. The purpose of
these examples is to demonstrate the properties of q: For all the examples, memory includes
only two-outcome lotteries where the relative frequency of realization matches the stated
probability. The size of memory is a function of ￿ for the ￿rst two examples and a function
of K for the last example. The ￿rst example demonstrates a similarity function which
depends only on the distance between the stated probability that is being evaluated and
that which resides in memory. This function ful￿lls all conditions of su¢ ciency mentioned
in the model.
s(q;p) = 1 ￿ (p ￿ q)
2
M =
8
<
:
(0:1;1);(0:2;1);(0:3;1);(0:4;1);(0:5;1);(0:6;1);(0:7;1);(0:8;1);(0:9;1);
(0:1;0);(0:2;0);(0:3;0);(0:4;0);(0:5;0);(0:6;0);(0:7;0);(0:8;0);(0:9;0)
9
=
;
17I =
8
<
:
1￿;2￿;3￿;4￿;5￿;6￿;7￿;8￿;9￿;
9￿;8￿;7￿;6￿;5￿;4￿;3￿;2￿;1￿
9
=
;
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
q
q
 
b
a
r
k=1
k=2
k=5
k=10
k=20
k=50
k=100
k=10000
q bar=q
Figure 1:example 1, q for di⁄erent levels of ￿
The second example shows a similarity function that tapers o⁄ to zero as one of its
arguments tends to 0 or to 1. It satis￿es s(0;p) = s(1;p) = s(q;0) = s(q;1) = 0 for all
p 2 (0;1) and q 2 (0;1). This example does not meet one of our conditions namely, that
s(q;p) = 0 only if the distance between p and q is 1. Yet the evaluations of very low and
very high probabilities are still over and under valued, respectively.
s(q;p) =
8
<
:
q(1￿p)
p(1￿q), q < p
p(1￿q)
q(1￿p); q ￿ p
M =
8
<
:
(0:1;1);(0:2;1);(0:3;1);(0:4;1);(0:5;1);(0:6;1);(0:7;1);(0:8;1);(0:9;1);
(0:1;0);(0:2;0);(0:3;0);(0:4;0);(0:5;0);(0:6;0);(0:7;0);(0:8;0);(0:9;0)
9
=
;
I =
8
<
:
1￿;2￿;3￿;4￿;5￿;6￿;7￿;8￿;9￿;
9￿;8￿;7￿;6￿;5￿;4￿;3￿;2￿;1￿
9
=
;
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Figure 2:example 2, q for di⁄erent levels of ￿
The third example is that of the k-NN similarity function:
s(q;p) =
8
> <
> :
1
X
(pi;d)2f(pi;d)jjpi￿qj<jp￿qjg
I(pi;d) < k
0 otherwise
M =
8
<
:
(0:1;1);(0:2;1);(0:3;1);(0:4;1);(0:5;1);(0:6;1);(0:7;1);(0:8;1);(0:9;1);
(0:1;0);(0:2;0);(0:3;0);(0:4;0);(0:5;0);(0:6;0);(0:7;0);(0:8;0);(0:9;0)
9
=
;
I =
8
<
:
1K2;2K2;3K2;4K2;5K2;6K2;7K2;8K2;9K2;
9K2;8K2;7K2;6K2;5K2;4K2;3K2;2K2;1K2
9
=
;
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Figure 3:example 3, q for di⁄erent levels of K:
As can be seen from the graphs, when the size of memory grows, the evaluation of q
converges to p as stated in Proposition 1. The evaluation of q is monotonically increasing
since memory is monotonically increasing as stated in Proposition 2 and Proposition 5.
Finally, low stated probabilities are overvalued and high stated probabilities are undervalued
as stated in Proposition 3.
6 Conclusions
Wakker (2004) suggested that perceptual and cognitive limitations cause the inverse S-shape
of weighted probabilities. Our model may be viewed as o⁄ering an explicit account of the type
of cognitive limitations involved, and of the way they give rise to distortion of probabilities. In
our model evaluations of probabilities are determined by including both cases with identical
stated probabilities and cases with similar stated probabilities. This type of procedure may
lead to distortion of probabilities as in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and
201992), which posited the overvaluation of low probabilities and the undervaluation of high
probabilities by decision makers.
There is a disagreement in the literature about the intersection point of the ￿ proba-
bility weight￿curve and the 45￿line. Preston and Baratta and Kahneman and Tversky found
that the intersection is about 0:2, while Mosteller and Nogee and Quiggin claimed that it
is 0:5. It is more natural to assume that the intersection point varies across individuals
and contexts rather than to assume that there exists a universal intersection point that is
identical for all people. The present model is ￿ exible enough to explain both patterns of
￿ndings and may even allow more than one intersection point.
It is well known that distortions of probabilities as opposed to distortions of cumu-
lative probabilities lead to violations of ￿rst order stochastic dominance. It comes as no
surprise that the model presented here su⁄ers from the same problem. Rank dependent
theories (Quiggin, 1982 and Yaari, 1987) have overcome this problem by replacing the trans-
formation of the probabilities by a transformation of the cumulative probabilities. Indeed,
subsequently, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) revised Prospect Theory to incorporate distor-
tion of cumulative probabilities.
It is possible to expand our model to deal with distortion of cumulative probabilities,
but this requires assuming much more understanding of the connection between probabilities
and prizes on the part of the decision maker. Speci￿cally, the decision maker would ￿rst have
to arrange the prizes in memory according to their order and calculate the cumulative stated
probabilities and only then proceed with the evaluation process of these cumulative stated
probabilities. A case would consists of a cumulative stated probability of winning at least
x and a result indicating whether this outcome had occurred. When arranging these cases
in memory, the decision maker would have to understand that if the outcome of winning at
least x was realized, then all outcomes of winning a prize smaller than x were realized as
well. Likewise, if this outcome was not realized then neither were all outcomes of winning a
21prize greater than x.
When dealing with a decision maker￿ s perception of probabilities, one must keep
in mind that the sample of experiences may be biased. Memory can include, among other
things, personal experience, friends￿and family￿ s experiences as well as information published
in newspapers. The selection of cases and outcomes may not be random; rather, it may
include many extraordinary cases, especially when the source of information is not personal.
There are many examples where various features of the cases in the decision maker￿ s memory
in￿ uence perception of probabilities. Casino owners believe that their clients￿perception of
probabilities can be in￿ uenced by their memory of slot machines lighting up and making loud
noise whenever someone wins. Combs and Slovic (1979) found that people￿ s perceptions of
the causes of death are positively correlated with the number of times that such causes
were published in the newspapers. Similarly, the phenomena of simultaneous over-insurance
and participation in state lotteries, may be explained by the media￿ s tendency to publish
disasters and success stories, while not publishing mundane incidents. These phenomena
are explained by "availability heuristics": the evaluation of probabilities in these examples
is a⁄ected by external features that make some cases more available to the decision maker￿ s
memory than are others. Although availability heuristics are connected to relative frequencies
of outcomes, systematic mistakes in the perception of probabilities may occur. These external
features cannot explain the distortion of probabilities in experiments involving only a formal
description of lotteries. By contrast, our model explains the distortion of probabilities based
on the stated probabilities themselves. In other situations, memory biases can shed light on
the over and undervaluation of some outcomes. The present model might be generalized to
capture such memory biases by adding more structure to memory, and by assigning higher
weight to cases that are easier to retrieve.
227 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First de￿ne It(p;d) as the number of occurrences of (p;d) in the
￿rst t lotteries. Similarly, de￿ne gt(!;p) =
It(p;1)
It(p;1)+It(p;0) as the relative frequency of p and
￿ qt(q;!) =
P
(p;d)2M
It(p;d)s(q;p)￿d
P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d)ts(q;p)￿ as the evaluation of q based on those ￿rst t lotteries. Denote
￿ q = plimt!1 ￿ qt(q):
The proof has three stages:
1. The ￿rst stage is to show that plimt!1 ￿ qt(q = ps) = gt(!;ps) for 8ps 2 P:
2. The second stage is to show that E
h
It(ps;1)
It(ps;1)+It(ps;0)
i
= ps for 8ps 2 P for t large enough:
3. The third stage is to show that ￿ q(q = ps) converges in probability to ps for 8ps 2 P:
Stage 1: Take any q = ps 2 P; then
￿ qt(q = ps) =
P
(p;d)2M
It(p;d)s(q;p)￿d
P
(p;d)2M
It(p;d)s(q;p)￿ =
It(ps;1)+
P
(p;d)2M; p6=ps
It(p;d)s(ps;p)￿d
It(ps;1)+It(ps;0)+
P
(p;d)2M; p6=ps
It(p;d)s(ps;p)￿:
Observe that 0 ￿
P
(p;d)2M; p6=ps
It(p;d)s(ps;p)￿d ￿
P
(p;d)2M; p6=ps
It(p;d)s(ps;p)￿ ￿ s(ps;pm)￿￿=￿
for some pm 6= ps and s(ps;pm) < 1: When t ! 1 then ￿ ! 1; so by L￿ Hospital￿ s rule
limt!1 s(ps;pm)￿￿=￿ = lim￿!1
￿=￿
(1=s(ps;pm))￿ = lim￿!1
1=￿
￿(1=s(ps;pm))￿￿1 ! 0: We get that both
limt!1
P
(p;d)2M; p6=ps
It(p;d)s(ps;p)￿d = 0 and limt!1
P
(p;d)2M; p6=ps
It(p;d)s(ps;p)￿ = 0. Together
with the assumption that ￿(! jIt(ps;1) + It(ps;0) = 0) = 0 for t large enough we get that
plimt!1 ￿ qt(q = ps) =
It(ps;1)
It(ps;1)+It(ps;0) = gt(!;ps):
Stage 2: We assumed that there exists a t0 such that for t > t0 ￿(! jIt(ps;1) + It(ps;0) > 0) =
1 8ps 2 P. Take t ￿ t0 and de￿ne R as the maximal number of outcomes of all possible
lotteries then, E [gt(!;ps)] = E
h
It(ps;1)
It(ps;1)+It(ps;0)
i
=
tR X
r=1
E
h
It(ps;1)
r jIt(ps;1) + It(ps;0) = r
i
￿(! jIt(ps;1) + It(ps;0) = r) =
23tR X
r=1
1
rrps￿(! jIt(ps;1) + It(ps;0) = r) = ps:
Stage 3: By stage 1 for every " there exists a t1 > t0 such that for all t > t1
P(! j j￿ qt(q = ps) ￿ gt(!;ps)j > ") < " since plimt!1 ￿ qt(q = ps) = gt(!;ps):
By stage 2 E [gt(!;ps)] = ps so for every " there exists a t2 > t0 such that for all
t > t2 P(! j (jgt(!;ps) ￿ psj) > ") < " due to the law of large numbers.
Given " take t > max(t1;t2):
Then P(! j j￿ q(q = ps) ￿ psj > 2") =
P(! j j￿ qt(q = ps) ￿ gt(!;ps) + gt(!;ps) ￿ psj > 2") ￿
P(! j j￿ qt(q = ps) ￿ gt(!;ps)j + jgt(!;ps) ￿ psj > 2") =
P(! j j￿ qt(q = ps) ￿ gt(!;ps)j > " or jgt(!;ps) ￿ psj > ") ￿
P(! j j￿ qt(q = ps) ￿ gt(!;ps)j > ") + P(! j j￿ q(!) ￿ gt(!;ps)j > ") < " + " = 2":
So ￿ q(q = ps) converges in probability to ps:
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof relies on a lemma proved by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1997). The lemma is constructed as follows: Let f = (f1;:::;fl) and g =
(g1;:::;gl) be two positive vectors such that
P
l fl =
P
l gl. Let h = (h1;:::hl) be a vector
satisfying h1 ￿ ::: ￿ hl.
Assume that for all , i < j
gi
gj ￿
fi
fj then g ￿ h0 ￿ f ￿ h0.
Let us arrange the cases in the decision maker￿ s memory according to those that were
realized (d = 1) and those that were not (d = 0), and within each category, let us order the
cases by p where p1 ￿ ::: ￿ pl
De￿ne fi =
s(q;pi)k[I(pi;1)+I(pi;0)] P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)k and gi =
s(q0;pi)k[I(pi;1)+I(pi;0)] P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q0;p)k , i = 1:::l, where q ￿ q0
and de￿ne hi =
I(pi;1)
I(pi;1)+I(pi;0). We have h1 ￿ ::: ￿ hl since
I(p1;1)
I(p1;1)+I(p1;0) ￿ ::: ￿
I(pl;1)
I(pl;1)+I(pl;0).
Observe that
P
l fl =
P
l gl = 1: In addition, notice that q = f ￿ h and ￿ q0 = g ￿ h; so all we
have to show is that if
@2s(q;p)
@q@p ￿ 0, the inequalities, for all i < j
gi
gj ￿
fi
fj hold, which in this
case are reduced to 8 i < j
s(q0;pi)
s(q0;pj) ￿
s(q;pi)
s(q;pj):
24We will examine each position of pi and pj with respect to q and q0 separately.
(i) The ￿rst case is pi ￿ q0 < q ￿ pj. In this case both jq0 ￿ pij < jq ￿ pij and
jq0 ￿ pjj > jq ￿ pjj therefore, s(q0;pi) > s(q;pi) and s(q0;pj) < s(q;pj) so, the inequal-
ity holds.
(ii) The second case is q0 ￿ pi < pj ￿ q: In this case both jq0 ￿ pij < jq0 ￿ pjj and
jq ￿ pij > jq ￿ pjj therefore, s(q0;pi) > s(q0;pj) and s(q;pi) < s(q;pj) so, the inequality
holds.
(iii) The third case is q0 < q ￿ pi < pj. The inequality
s(q0;pi)
s(q0;pj) ￿
s(q;pi)
s(q;pj) holds if and only
if R ￿ 0 where R is de￿ned as R = s(q0;pi)s(q;pj) ￿ s(q0;pj)s(q;pi): Let us look at
dR
dq0 = s0
q0(q0;pi)s(q;pj) ￿ s0
q0(q0;pj)s(q;pi): Notice that s(q;pj) < s(q;pi) since pi < pj.
Furthermore, both s0
q0(q0;pj) > 0 and s0
q0(q0;pi) > 0 because q0 < pi;pj and
s0
q0(q0;pi) < s0
q0(q0;pj) since
@2s(p;q)
@p@q0 ￿ 0 therefore,dR
dq0 < 0. Since R = 0 for q0 = q and
dR
dq0 < 0 it follows that R > 0. Hence, the inequality holds.
(iv) The fourth case is pi < pj ￿ q0 < q . With R de￿ned as above, let us look at
dR
dq = s(q0;pi)s0
q(q;pj) ￿ s(q0;pj)s0
q(q;pi): Since pi < pj; we have s(q0;pi) < s(q0;pj):
Furthermore, both s0
q(q;pj) < 0 and s0
q(q;pi) < 0 because q > pi;pj and s0
q(q;pj) >
s0
q(q;pi) since
@2s(p;q)
@p@q ￿ 0 therefore,dR
dq > 0. Since R = 0 for q0 = q and dR
dq > 0 it
follows that R > 0: Hence, the inequality holds.
(v) The ￿fth case is q0 < pi ￿ q ￿ pj: With R de￿ned as above, let us look at
dR
dq = s(q0;pi)s0
q(q;pj) ￿ s(q0;pj)s0
q(q;pi). Since pi < q ￿ pj; we have s0
q(q;pj) > 0 and
s0
q(q;pi) < 0 therefore dR
dq > 0. By case (iii) R ￿ 0 for q0 < pi = q: Together with
dR
dq > 0 it follows that R > 08: Hence, the inequality holds.
8Even though it may be the case that s0
q(q;pi) and s0
q(q;pj) do not exist at q = pi and q = pj; respectively,
it is su¢ cient that s0
q+(q;pi) and s0
q￿(q;pj) exist for the proof to follow through.
25(vi) The sixth case is pi ￿ q0 ￿ pj < q: With R de￿ned as above, once more, let us look
at dR
dq = s0
q0(q0;pi)s(q;pj) ￿ s0
q0(q0;pj)s(q;pi): Since pi ￿ q0 < pj; we have s0
q0(q0;pi) < 0
and s0
q0(q0;pj) > 0 therefore dR
dq0 < 0. By case (iv) R ￿ 0 for pj = q0 < q. Together with
dR
dq0 < 0 it follows that R > 09: Hence, the inequality holds.
Since (i) to (vi) cover all possible cases, we get that for q0 < q and all pi < pj
s(q0;pi)
s(q0;pj) ￿
s(q;pi)
s(q;pj) which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take any q ￿ ql =
I(pl;0)
I(pl;0)+I(pl;1), then
h
(1 ￿ q)
I(p;1)
I(p;0)+I(p;1) ￿ q
I(p;0)
I(p;0)+I(p;1)
i
￿ 0 for all p 2 P: The expression
P
p2P [I(p;0) + I(p;1)]s(q;p)k
h
(1 ￿ q)
I(p;1)
I(p;0)+I(p;1) ￿ q
I(p;0)
I(p;0)+I(p;1)
i
is non-negative since
[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]s(q;p)k is non-negative. After rearranging we get
P
p2P [I(p;0) + I(p;1)]s(q;p)k
h
(1 ￿ q)
I(p;1)
I(p;0)+I(p;1) ￿ q
I(p;0)
I(p;0)+I(p;1)
i
=
(1 ￿ q)
P
(p;1)2M I(p;1)s(q;p)k ￿ q
P
(p;0)2M I(p;0)s(q;p)k =
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)kd ￿ q
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)k ￿ 0:
We divide this inequality by
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)k > 0 and get
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)kd
P
(p;d)2M I(p;d)s(q;p)k ￿ q = ￿ q ￿ q ￿ 0:
Therefore ￿ q ￿ q for q ￿ ql . The proof for q ￿ qh =
I(ph;0)
I(ph;0)+I(ph;1) is similar.
Proof of Proposition 4. The expectation of ￿ q is overvalued when
Ep1;:::;pL (￿ q ￿ q) > 0:
Then Ep1;:::;pL(￿ q ￿ q) = Ep1;:::;pL
0
B B
B
@
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k1(pi)+s(q;1￿pi)k1(1￿pi)
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k+s(q;1￿pi)k
￿ q
1
C C
C
A
> 0 ()
9Even though it may be the case that s0
q0(q0;pi) and s0
q0(q0;pj) do not exist at q0 = pi and q0 = pj;
respectively, it is su¢ cient that s0
q0+(q0;pi) and s0
q0￿(q0;pj) exist for the proof to follow through.
26Ep1;:::;pL
0
B B B
@
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k1(pi)+s(q;1￿pi)k1(1￿pi)￿q
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k+s(q;1￿pi)k
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k+s(q;1￿pi)k
1
C C C
A
> 0.
Since the denominator is positive for all memories,
Ep1;:::;pL(￿ q ￿ q) > 0 ()
Ep1;:::;pL
 
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k1(pi) + s(q;1 ￿ pi)k1(1 ￿ pi) ￿ q
L X
i=1
s(q;pi)k + s(q;1 ￿ pi)k
!
>
0:
Since pi is iid Ep1;:::;pL(￿ q(q) ￿ q) > 0 ,
LEp
￿
s(q;p)k1(p) + s(q;1 ￿ p)k1(1 ￿ p) ￿ q
￿
s(q;p)k + s(q;1 ￿ p)k￿￿
> 0:
Then Ep
￿
s(q;p)k1(p) + s(q;1 ￿ p)k1(1 ￿ p) ￿ q
￿
s(q;p)k + s(q;1 ￿ p)k￿￿
=
1
2
0:5 Z
0
(s(q;p)(p ￿ q) + s(q;1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ p ￿ q)dp =
1
2
0
@
0:5 Z
0
s(q;p)(p ￿ q)dp +
0:5 Z
0
s(q;1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ p ￿ q)dp
1
A:
Let q < 1
2;then
1
2
0
@
0:5 Z
0
s(q;p)(p ￿ q)dp +
0:5 Z
0
s(q;1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ p ￿ q)dp
1
A =
1
2
0
@
q Z
0
s(q;p)(p ￿ q)dp +
0:5 Z
q
s(q;p)(p ￿ q)dp +
0:5 Z
0
s(q;1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ p ￿ q)dp
1
A =
1
2
0
@￿
q Z
0
s(￿)￿d￿ +
0:5￿q Z
0
s(￿)￿d￿ +
1￿q Z
0:5￿q
s(￿)￿d￿
1
A = 1
2
1￿q Z
q
s(￿)￿d￿ > 0.
Therefore Ep1;:::;pL (￿ q ￿ q) > 0 for q < 1
2. The proof for q > 1
2 is similar.
Proof of Proposition 5. In order to simplify the expressions we use the following
notation:
f(p) =
I(p;1)
I(p;0)+I(p;1) is the relative frequency of cases with a stated probability p:
27N(q) = fp j p is among q k-NNg
N(q ^ q0) = fp j p is among both q and q0 k-NNg
N(q￿q0) = fp j p is among q k-NN but not among q0 k-NNg
I(q) =
P
p2N(q)
I(p;1) + I(p;0)
I(q ^ q0) =
P
p2N(q^q0)
I(p;1) + I(p;0)
I(q￿q0) =
P
p2N(q￿q0)
I(p;1) + I(p;0)
f(pq￿q0
m ) = min
p2N(q￿q0)
f(p), f(p
q0￿q
M ) = max
p2N(q0￿q)
f(p), f(pq^q0
m ) = min
p2N(q^q0)
f(p) and
f(p
q^q0
M ) = max
p2N(q^q0)
f(p)
Let q ￿ q0; then minp N(q￿q0) ￿ maxp N(q ^ q0) ￿ minp N(q ^ q0) ￿ maxp N(q0￿q):
Since memory is monotonically increasing f(pq￿q0
m ) ￿ f(p
q^q0
M ) ￿ f(pq^q0
m ) ￿ f(p
q0￿q
M ):
For the k-NN similarity function q =
P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d)s(q;p)d
P
(p;d)2M
I(p;d)s(q;p) =
P
p2N(q)
f(p)[I(p;0)+I(p;1)]
I(q) : So, q ￿
q0 , (q ￿ q0)I(q)I(q0) ￿ 0:
By rearranging the expression we get (q ￿ q0)I(q)I(q0) =
I(q0)
P
p2N(q)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)] ￿ I(q)
P
p2N(q0)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)] =
[I(q0￿q) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]￿
[I(q￿q0) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q0)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)] =
[I(q0￿q) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q￿q0)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]+
[I(q0￿q) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q^q0)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]￿
[I(q￿q0) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q0￿q)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]￿
[I(q￿q0) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q0^q)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)] =
[I(q0￿q) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q￿q0)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]+
I(q0￿q)
P
p2N(q^q0)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]￿
[I(q￿q0) + I(q ^ q0)]
P
p2N(q0￿q)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)]￿
28I(q￿q0)
P
p2N(q0^q)
f(p)[I(p;0) + I(p;1)] ￿
[I(q0￿q) + I(q ^ q0)]f(pq￿q0
m )I(q￿q0) + I(q0￿q)f(pq^q0
m )I(q ^ q0)￿
[I(q￿q0) + I(q ^ q0)]f(p
q0￿q
M )I(q0￿q) ￿ I(q￿q0)f(p
q^q0
M )I(q ^ q0) =
I(q0￿q)I(q￿q0)
h
f(pq￿q0
m ) ￿ f(p
q0￿q
M )
i
+ I(q ^ q0)I(q￿q0)
h
f(pq￿q0
m ) ￿ f(p
q^q0
M )
i
+
I(q ^ q0)I(q0￿q)
h
f(pq^q0
m ) ￿ f(p
q0￿q
M )
i
:
Since all addends are non negative the expression is non negative. Hence, q ￿ q0 as
required.
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